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Abstract. During the time of the election, indigenous minorities face enormous problems 
and difficulties. At times, their basic democratic rights are not always freely exercised. This 
paper explores the challenges encountered by one of Ethiopia’s indigenous minorities, the 
Hararis, during the sixth national election in Ethiopia. A descriptive, qualitative research 
method was used to investigate the nature of the problem and resolutions came up. 
Primary data (published legal documents, court cases and formal letters) were collected 
from various sources. The National Election Board of Ethiopia has inadvertently attempted 
to prevent the rights of indigenous minority Hararis (living in other parts of the country) 
from voting for candidates that form the Harari National Assembly. The basic reasons for 
the National Election Board to do so have no legal justification and are challenged by the 
federal and regional constitutions, particularly by articles explicitly addressing minorities 
and Hararis residing outside the Harari region to vote. The final decisions made by the 
federal cassation court were found to be correct, fair, acceptable, and in concurrence with 
the federal and regional constitutions. The study found out that the federal and regional 
constitutions of the country play a prominent role in protecting the rights of minorities to 
vote. 
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1. Introduction  
t is obvious that the participation of citizens in a free and fair election is 
a precondition for the establishment of a democratic state. Some of the 
basic and mandatory rights that citizens in democratic nations exercise 
include the right to give their vote freely without any interference, to form 
a political party, to be a member of a political party, to be elected and to 
form a government for self‒administration after winning an election. 
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Participation and protection of citizens’ rights during elections, especially 
those of indigenous minorities, is very crucial since decisions made at local 
and national government levels affect their lives. Several international 
human rights declarations (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) clearly emphasize and 
guarantee the participation of minority ethnic groups in the electoral 
process. 
Ethiopia, located in the eastern part of Africa, is a country endowed with 
diverse ethnic groups, whereby more than 90 different tribes with 86 
languages are spoken. Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populated nation 
with distinct ethnic, linguistic, religious, and minority groups that have 
co‒existed for centuries. The current Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (FDRE) constitutes the federal government's state members (ten 
regions and two city administrations). Harari People’s Regional State 
(HPRS) is one of the smallest member states located in the eastern part of 
the country with estimation of more than half a million population. It is one 
of the most ancient City (next to Axum) with various cultural heritages, 
including the walled city of "Jegol", which was registered in 2003 by 
UNESCO as one of the world’s heritages. The indigenous inhabitants that 
established the city before 1200 belong to the Harari ethnic tribes. The 
Hararis are the founders of the walled city "Jegol" and are considered as 
indigenous minority groups due to the small number of their population 
(estimated to be less than 15%) compared to other ethnic groups in the 
region. 
The indigenous Hararis used to administer their territory for centuries 
with their own successive kings (about 72 kings). They used to have their 
own constitution and coins that contributed to the economic transactions of 
the eastern trade route that extended to Berbera, Zeyla, and India. 
However, the independent state of Hararis came to an end after its last king 
(Emir Abdullahi) was defeated by Minilik –II at the battle of Chellenko in 
1887. After losing the war, the ancient city became part of the newly unified 
and established Ethiopia. The indigenous Hararis lost their freedom, land, 
and were forced into exile. After long years of oppression, injustice and 
discrimination, the Hararis once again got the chance to self‒administer 
when the newly established federal democratic republic of Ethiopia was 
formed in 1991. Harar became one of the 10 regional states with the first 
democratic election being conducted and the voices of indigenous Hararis 
came to power. The Hararis formed their own regional state, started to 
self‒administer and represented their ethnic group both at regional and 
federal levels. 
As part of the FDRE, the newly established HPNRS formulated and 
implemented a regional constitution. According to article 51 of the regional 
constitution, the regional parliament/Harari people regional state council 
(HPRSC) is the highest authority with the power to "initiate every matter 
relating to economic, social, and developmental policy strategy". The 
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HPRSC consists of 36 total seats reserved for political candidates freely and 
democratically elected by the inhabitants of the region. From these 36 total 
seats, 14 seats are reserved solely for the Harari National Assembly (HNA), 
for which indigenous minority Hararis run for election. According to article 
50 (2) of the Harari regional constitution, members of the HNA are elected 
by Harari ethnic minorities living inside the Harari region and other 
regions of Ethiopia (including those living in the two administrative cities, 
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa). And in the past five elections, Hararis who 
live outside the Harari region participated in elections by giving their votes 
to candidates that run for the 14 seats in the HNA. In addition, Hararis 
living inside the Harari region and other parts of the country were allowed 
to give their vote for one seat solely reserved for Harari ethnic groups in 
the federal parliament. 
However, during the sixth national election (2021), the NEBE announced 
that Hararis who live outside the Harari region should not be allowed to 
vote for the 14 HNA seats and one federal parliament seat and banned the 
registration of Hararis living outside the Harari region for election. The 
current paper aims to investigate the challenges posed by the NEBE to 
indigenous Harari minorities living outside the Harari region and describes 
the event/situation in relation to the federal and regional constitutions of 
the country. The paper presents the details of the dispute between the 
NEBE and HNA, legal procedures followed by concerned bodies, court 
cases, and finally resolutions obtained. 
 
2. Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this study are: 
1) To assess how indigenous minorities, specifically Hararis, are 
recognized in Ethiopia's federal and Harari regional state constitutions. 
2) What are the main challenges confronting the Harari National 
Assembly during the sixth national and regional elections? 
3) How does the Harari National Assembly protects the rights of 
indigenous Hararis in future elections? 
 
3. Methodology 
In order to achieve the intended purpose, it is mandatory to clearly 
explain the appropriate methodology used in this study. A descriptive, 
qualitative research method was used to investigate the nature of the 
problem and resolutions came up. Primary data (published legal 
documents and formal letters) were collected from various sources, 
including the federal and regional constitutions, the House of People’s 
Representative Office (HoPRO), HNA, the election board, and the federal 
supreme and cassation courts. Systematic data analysis was conducted and 
reported chronologically.  
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4. The concept of indigenous and minority people 
Indigenous and minority people have many similarities and share many 
common characteristics. For example, Shaheen & Javaid (2001: 7) noted in 
support of this argument that "from a substantive and practical standpoint, 
indigenous people tend to exemplify the minority syndrome‒historical 
records attest to systematic persecution, discrimination, and genocide 
suffered by minorities and indigenous peoples in tandem." Furthermore, 
according to the report of Minority Rights Group International (1997), a 
number of minority groups, like the indigenous people, were exterminated, 
while the survivors were conquered or subjugated. 
In fact, as for many other terminologies, there is no universally accepted 
identification criterion to determine which societies are indigenous and 
which are not in each state. Nonetheless, after Second World War, different 
countries used the terms in reference to human societies in their own 
unique local context. In western countries, the dividing line between 
indigenous peoples and others is not clear or precise. In some states, the 
extent to which a group has played a role in the process of state formation 
is an important distinguishing feature for determining whether certain 
people are indigenous or nonindigenous (Kymlicka in Kymlicka & He, 
2005, 48). This criterion, however, is not universally applicable in 
all western countries. 
The special UN rapporteur Mr. Martinez Cobo (1972) defined the term 
indigenous people as follow: “Indigenous populations are composed of the 
existing descendants of the peoples who inhabited the present territory of a 
country wholly or partially at the time when persons of a different culture 
or ethnic origin arrived there from other parts of the world, overcame 
them, by conquest, settlement or other means, reduced them to a 
non‒dominant or colonial condition; who today live more in conformity 
with their particular social, economic and cultural customs and traditions 
than with the institutions of the country of which they now form part, 
under a state structure which incorporates mainly national, social and 
cultural characteristics of other segments of the population which are 
predominant”. 
The term indigenous is associated with colonialism in the context of 
international laws such as the ILO Convention, UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, 
and DRIP, particularly colonialism undertaken by external states while 
excluding domestic aspects of colonization. Hence, Kymlicka connected 
this view with the ‘saltwater thesis’ of European colonization of other states 
(Kymlicka in Kymlicka & He, 2005). Therefore, pertaining to the 
assumption, all Indian and white people residing in South Africa by 
colonial operation have been considered as nonindigenous people, while 
only the black South African people are indigenous people in the context of 
South Africa. Based on the above mentioned international laws, one can 
clearly claim that all Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples can be 
considered as indigenous people because Ethiopia is the only African state 
which was not colonized by an external body. 
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Others associate the term “indigenous people” with political exclusion, 
economic marginalization, cultural vulnerability, geographical isolation, 
and long‒standing settlement (Kingsbury 1995, 1999). To be precise, the 
basic criterion to define certain groups as indigenous and non‒indigenous 
is not uniform in all countries; the terminology has been used in different 
countries and enshrined in international laws. Recognition of the rights of 
indigenous people in international law is often framed as a condition of 
deepening democratic citizenship. Hence, some countries in the world 
accept the usefulness and validity of the term as others continue to resist it. 
"But the term punctuates the political landscape in developed and 
developing countries, in the east and in the west. Its politics revolves 
around four different types of claims: participation and representation; 
access to resources; autonomy and self‒government; and the protection of 
language and culture" (Jung, 2008, 184). 
Despite numerous attempts to develop a definition of the term 
"minority", no agreement has been reached on the definitional issue. The 
most recent and significant effort to define a "minority" was made by 
Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti. According to Capotorti, a minority 
is “a group numerically smaller than the rest of the population of the state 
to which it belongs and possessing cultural, physical, or historical 
characteristics, a religion, or a language different from the rest of the 
population” (Capotorti, 1978, 7). Therefore, according to Capotorti's 
definition of minority, no single ethnic group constitutes a majority in 
Ethiopia. Beken (2010) also noted in this context that under Capotorti's 
definition, all “nations, nationalities, and peoples” in Ethiopia can be 
considered ethnic minorities. At this point, we can also conclude that 
Ethiopia is a collection of ethnic minorities because no single ethnic group 
constitutes 50+1 percent of the country's total population. 
In contrast, according to Capotorti's definition, a single ethnic group 
constitutes the majority in some Ethiopian regional states. For instance, 
Tigray is the majority in Tigray regional state, Amhara in Amhara regional 
state, Oromo in Oromia regional state, Afar in Afar regional state, Somali in 
Somali regional state, and Sidama in Sidama regional state. On the other 
hand, no single ethnic group constitutes a majority in the remaining four 
regional states (i.e. Benishangul Gumuz, Gamballa and Southern nation 
nationalities regional states), including Harari national regional state. As a 
result, in terms of the minority and majority scenarios, the Harari regional 
state is comprised of ethnic minorities. 
 
5. Mechanisms of the protection of minority rights  
Ethnic diversities are viewed as a burden in African countries. However, 
diversity as a social fact always existed in the world‒at‒large but it 
becomes a "problem" mainly when it exists within the territory of a state 
(Akhtar et al. in Watts & Chattopadhyay, 2008). There are two main reasons 
why ethno‒linguistic diversity within the state territory becomes a 
problem. One, when social, cultural, or racial differences become the basis 
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of group inequality (Akhtar et al. in Watts & Chattopadhyay, 2008). Two, 
when different groups perceive one another as inferiors or superiors. 
Hence, in the current political dynamics, particularly since WWII, 
managing diversity has emerged as the foremost overarching and urgent 
issue in ethnically heterogeneous states. There are different mechanisms 
that can be used to protect the rights of ethnic minorities in plural states. 
For instance, recognition, representation, providing autonomy and power 
sharing. 
In Ethiopia, ethnic–federalism has been opted as the institutional 
arrangement primarily to address the challenges of ethnic diversity. 
Regional states are also responsible in this context for recognizing and 
promoting existing diversity based on their own local context. When 
seeking better constitutional accommodation within a multinational state, 
the aspirations of sub‒state national societies touch upon both legal and 
political elements (Stephen, 2004). One example of the former is the 
amendment (or the re‒interpretation) of the formal constitution, whereas 
the political elements can be identified in the refinement of constitutional 
conventions, practices and principles, or the political culture and value 
system informing the given constitution (Stephen, 2004). There are various 
mechanisms that can be used to manage ethnic diversity. The major areas 
to which sub‒state national societies aspire regarding diversity 
management. Such as providing regional autonomy or constitutional 
devolution of power, constitutional recognition of diversity, power sharing 
or consociationalism, and representation or participation in various 
institutions.  
 
5.1. Federalism or allowing territorial autonomy 
With the exception of Canada and Switzerland, most of the early 
federations did not use federalism to address issues of ethnic diversity. 
However, after the cold war, many multinational states attempted to use 
federalism as a tool to manage ethno‒linguistic conflicts. Federalism as a 
political idea has become increasingly important as a way of peacefully 
reconciling the principles of unity and diversity usually in multi–national 
states. Actually, federalism is a very important state structure for achieving 
both unity and diversity by accommodating, preserving and promoting 
distinct identities within a larger political union (Elazar, 1987). In 
supporting this argument, as stated earlier, Anderson (2008: 12) also 
asserted that, "federalism seems suited to democracies with large 
populations or territories with highly diverse populations that are 
regionally concentrated". Various scholars continuously claim that one of 
the most important and effective means to manage the ethnic conflicts in 
multinational societies is a federal system. Federalism is a constitutional 
device that could be used in managing ethnic diversity. 
Naturally, federal solutions for managing ethno‒linguistic diversity are 
inextricably linked to territorial approaches to diversity management. It is a 
mechanism aimed at granting a certain level of territorial autonomy to a 
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group that differs from the majority of the state's population and though 
constitutes the majority in a specific region (Lapidoth, 1997). Accordingly, 
this mechanism includes the right for the population of the designated 
autonomous territory to elect its own legislature. It also gives them the 
authority to take charge of executive, judicial and administrative 
functions. Nevertheless, the applicability of a federal solution depends, 
therefore, on the degree to which ethnic diversity is geographically 
concentrated and so can be territorially demarcated (Watts, 2000). 
According to Stephen (2004), sub‒state ethnic groups demand 
asymmetry, or self‒governing rights, in the context of autonomy. 
Autonomy in this context means that regional or sub‒national societies 
might seek additional or distinctive powers in comparison to the rest of the 
country, and these powers should be constitutionally entrenched. These 
powers usually allow regional societies to autonomously manage specific 
issues that are of particular interest to them and that are limited to 
domestic policy areas (from education to social policies, economic 
development and cultural aspects, etc. (Nicola & Lecours, 2008). In other 
words, these groups demand some form of political autonomy or territorial 
jurisdiction, so as to ensure the full and free development of their cultures 
and the best interest of their people (Kymlicka, 1995). Some scholars have 
talked in this regard of strengthening the minorities’ voice at the periphery 
(Nicola & Lecours, 2008) and this can be done through different tools, 
including devolution of powers or a federal system (in cases where a 
federal structure is not yet in place) (Nicola & Lecours, 2008). In both cases, 
this solution might entail a significant change in the structure of the state 
(Nicola & Lecours, 2008). 
There are a number of arguments that scholars usually advance to refute 
asymmetrical treatment for national societies (Stephen, 2004). According to 
the first theory or idea, a modern developed government should be more 
concerned with political efficiency rather than with cultural or national 
recognition (Stephen, 2004). The second argument resists asymmetry on the 
ground that it might endanger the mono‒national vision of the state; 
consequently, symmetrical solutions are encouraged so that sub‒state 
national societies are not perceived as distinctive (Stephen, 2004). Finally, 
according to the third idea, asymmetry should be discouraged since it 
might help promote secessionist tendencies inside the given territory, 
(Stephen, 2004) or create "first‒and second‒class citizens" (Kymlicka & 
Norman, 2000). Thus, asymmetrical solutions are not always easy to 
implement, and at times they might not be easily accepted by the rest of the 
country: In fact, one other problem that can emerge, in addition to the three 
described above, is that asymmetry might fuel sentiments of suspiciousness 
and hatred among those communities who do not belong to the regional 
state. 
 
5.2. Constitutional recognition of diversity 
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Constitutional recognition of diversity is one of the mechanisms for 
managing diversity in a multicultural state. The struggle of sub‒state ethnic 
groups for increased or improved recognition is inextricably linked to 
autonomy and representation (Stephen, 2004). Usually, scholars use this 
term to refer to the desire for constitutional recognition of a sub‒state 
national society's language or other symbolic issues such as flags, anthems, 
or other totems (Stephen, 2004). In multinational states or federations, 
where linguistic cleavage is a major component, official bi‒or 
multi‒lingualism is actually a preferred tool to give minorities a platform to 
express their voice at the centre, and this type of policy can also increase 
minority representation in such institutions such as parliament, the courts, 
the army and the bureaucracy, as it facilitates advancement for linguistic 
minorities (Nicola & Lecours, 2008). In other words, recognition is 
inextricably linked to the alleged distinctiveness of the sub‒state national 
group, its behaviors, traditions, and traits that allow clearly identifying and 
distinguishing one sub‒state national group from the others. Taylor praises 
recognition in general because it shapes one's identity. Consequently, 
[n]onrecognition or misrecognition can cause harm and be a form of 
oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode 
of being (Taylor, 1994, 25). Taylor considers due recognition to be a "vital 
human need" and, accordingly, he believes that misrecognition can inflict a 
severe wound, leaving victims with crippling self-hatred (Taylor, 1994, 26). 
 
5.3. Representation in political institutions  
The institutional design of regional states in Ethiopia is the main 
determinant factor for responding to the challenges of internal minorities 
and accommodating multi‒cultural societies at the local level (Yonatan, 
2008). Therefore, an accommodative institutional setup of regional states 
guarantees the right to self‒administration and the right to take part in any 
administrative units, and the right to political participation of ethnic 
groups of the regional state (Yonatan, 2008). The institutional 
accommodation and fair representation of ethnic cleavages of the regional 
state can be used as the best indicator for inclusive political participation of 
the existing diversity in the region. In diverse states, the institutional 
response that suggests a state shift away from the nation‒state paradigm 
and toward a politics of recognition and accommodation is presented as a 
promising alternative (Yonatan, 2008). The acceptance of institutional 
measures that supplement and provide practical effect to the act of 
recognition is a corollary of the decision to adopt the principle of 
recognition (Yonatan, 2008). Policymakers and academics advocate a 
variety of institutional reforms that would allow multi‒ethnic states to 
accommodate ethnic demands without jeopardizing their political integrity 
(Yonatan, 2008). The institutional principles that embody core values and 
can respond to the needs of an ethnically diverse state through a carefully 
orchestrated pragmatic application (Yonatan, 2008). 
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In this context, representation refers to situations in which the ethnic 
diversity inherent in the regional state is reflected within regional and local 
institutions; in other words, the presence of representatives from various 
ethnic groups within regional and local institutions is enhanced. In this 
regard, enhancing the voice of each ethnic group in the regional state, so 
that the regional state is perceived as a compact of people rather than a 
single ethnic community. Hence, representation occurs in a variety of ways. 
Regional bureaucratic positions tailored to the region's ethnic diversity 
could be created. It can also occur through the establishment of a regional 
chamber representing the interests of the region's various cleavages, or 
through some form of representation within the region's constitutional 
interpretation council.  
 
6. The protection of minority rights under the FDRE 
constitution 
Every nation, nationality, and people have equal rights, status, and 
recognition under the FDRE constitution. For instance, Article 39 of the 
FDRE constitution provides explicit recognition that "every nation, 
nationality, and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to 
self‒determination, including the right to secession. Every nation, 
nationality, and people in Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write, and to 
develop their own language; to express, develop, and promote their 
culture; and to preserve their history. Every nation, nationality and people 
in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self‒government which 
includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory 
that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and federal 
governments "(refer to Article 39 (1, 2 & 3) of the FDRE constitution). 
Furthermore, the preamble and Article 8 of the FDRE constitution also 
make a commitment to protect the legitimate interests of the Ethiopian 
nation, nationalities and peoples. The constitution's preamble declares that: 
‘We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia: Strongly 
committed, in full and free exercise of our right to self‒determination, to 
building a political community founded on the rule of law and capable of 
ensuring a lasting peace, guaranteeing a democratic order, and advancing 
our economic and social development’ (refer the preamble of FDRE 
constitution). The preamble commits to making adequate provisions to 
protect Ethiopia's legitimate interests of nations, nationalities, and peoples. 
A reading of the constitution's preamble reveals the drafters' enthusiasm to 
recognize the existence of diverse ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups in 
Ethiopia: One phrase in particular stands out: ‘…full respect of individual 
and people' fundamental freedoms and rights, live together on the basis of 
equality' and without any sexual, religious or cultural discrimination’. 
Similarly, Article 25 of FDRE constitution states that “all persons are equal 
and effective protection without discrimination on grounds of race, nation, 
nationality, or other social origin, language, religion….”According to 
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Article 8 of the FDRE constitution, “All sovereign power resides in the 
Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia” and the constitution is an 
expression of their sovereignty. In addition to this, Article 47 (2) of FDRE 
constitution recognized that nations, nationalities and peoples within the 
States enumerated in sub‒Article 1 of this article have the right to establish, 
at any time, their own States (Article 47 (1) of FDRE constitution). On this 
basis, one could argue that the FDRE constitution refers to various ethnic 
groups as "nations, nationalities, and peoples."  
In contrast, the constitution makes no distinction between ethnic groups 
in terms of minority and majority. The constitution does not define the 
terms minority and majority in terms of ethnic group. However, without 
making a clear distinction, Article 54 (2) and (3) of the FDRE constitution 
attempt to describe the special representation of minority nationalities and 
people in the House of People's Representatives. In this context, Article 54 
(2) and (3), for example, specifically stated that “members of the House 
shall be elected from candidates in each electoral district by a plurality of 
the votes cast. Provisions shall be made by law for special representation 
for minority Nationalities and Peoples. Members of the House, on the basis 
of population and special representation of minority Nationalities and 
Peoples, shall not exceed 550; of these, minority Nationalities and Peoples 
shall have at least 20 seats. Particulars shall be determined by law”. The 
term "minority nationalities and peoples" appears in the FDRE constitution 
(refer, for example, Article 54 (2) and (3)), but no clear description of who 
constitutes a minority nationality or people in Ethiopia.  
However, Article 13 of Proclamation No. 1162/2019, on the other hand, 
addressed the issue of constituencies. The following was stated in Article 
13 (b, c, and d) of this Proclamation regarding minority representation in 
the House of Peoples' Representatives. Article 13 (b) of this Proclamation, 
for example, states that "the country shall have one representative per 
constituency to be elected to the House of Peoples' Representatives, where 
the total number of constituencies shall not exceed 550; and the 
constituencies shall be determined on the basis of population and the 
number of minority nationalities and peoples with special representation." 
Except in the case of constituencies for the representation of minority 
nationalities and peoples, the population of the constituencies must be 
comparable, with the highest average population deviation between 
constituencies not exceeding 15%.” In addition, Article 13 (c & d) of the 
same Proclamation declared that “there shall be constituencies for the 
representation of minority nationalities and peoples whose number is not 
less than 20 and which are deemed to require special representation in 
accordance with Article 54 of the Constitution.” Minority nationalities 
deemed to require special representation shall be determined by the House 
of Federation based on predetermined criteria.” 
It is also true that the meaning of minority nationalities and people 
adopted by the drafters of the FDRE constitution is not clear. The FDRE 
constitution, as well as any other formal written laws and regulations, did 
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not provide a comprehensive and concise definition of a minority 
nationality or people in contemporary Ethiopia. Thus, an examination of 
the above‒mentioned definitional considerations of which nation, 
nationalities, and people constitute a minority reveals the concept's 
ambiguity in the country. Nonetheless, in order to provide minority 
nationalities and peoples with a voice in the House of Peoples 
Representatives, Article 54 (2) and (3) of the FDRE constitution reserved 
twenty seats for minority nationalities and peoples. Minority groups with a 
population of at least 20 people have the right to have a representative in 
the House of People's Representatives, where one Member of Parliament 
currently represents 100,000 people. In this context, the representation of 
Harari people in the House of Peoples Representatives has been executed 
based on Article 54 (2) and (3) of the FDRE constitution. In addition to this, 
FDRE constitution clearly recognized that each nation, nationality and 
people shall be represented in the House of the Federation by at least one 
member (refer to Article 61(2) of FDRE constitution). We can conclude from 
this constitutional provision that numerically smaller ethnic groups have 
guaranteed representation in the House of Federation. The reason is that 
the constitution stipulates that each nation, nationality, and people have at 
least one representative in the House of Federation. Thus, the Harari ethnic 
group has had one seat in the Federal House of Federation since the 
country's federal state structure was established. 
 
7. The protection of Harari people under Harari 
regional state constitution  
Ethiopia now has ten regions, including the newly formed Sidama 
regional state. Harari is one of these regions that was established to offer 
the Harari people autonomy over their own affairs. The Constitution of the 
FDRE declares that the Harari regional state is one of the nine member 
states of the FDRE (refer to Art 47 (1) of the FDRE constitution). According 
to the FDRE constitution, nations, nationalities, and people can govern 
themselves. In this regard, the present National Regional State of Harari 
was established immediately upon the ratification of the FDRE constitution 
in 1994. It should be noted that the Harari region was created primarily for 
the Harari people. In light of this, Article 8 of the Harari regional state 
constitution stipulates that all sovereign power resides with the people of 
Harari (refer to Article 8 of the 2004 revised Harari regional state 
constitution). The Harari regional state constitution, which was revised in 
2004, recognized the Harari people beginning with the preamble, and 
created a conducive environment for the Harari people to govern 
themselves. For example, the second and third paragraphs of the 2004 
revised Harari regional state constitution explain the following. 
Recognizing the need for a special representation strategy due to the fact 
that the Harari people have been displaced due to the movement and 
struggle of the Harari community at various times to end the oppressive 
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regime in the country. It is clear from this provision that the constitution of 
the Harari regional state clearly recognizes the indigenous minority Harari 
community and that there should be a special system of representation for 
the Harari people within the state.  
In addition to the above mentioned, Article 39 of the revised Harari 
regional state constitution clearly states that the Harari people have the 
right to self‒government and the right to secession. Hence, Article 39 (1, 2 
& 3) of the Harari regional state constitution stipulates that "the people of 
Harari have the right to preserve their national identity, to preserve their 
heritage, and to use their language to develop their language and to 
express their culture. The people of Harari have the right to 
self‒determination within their own geographical territory and to 
participate effectively and equitably in the Federal Government of Ethiopia 
in a free and fair manner. The Harari people have the right to 
self‒government and have the right to establish self‒governing institutions 
in their own lands and to have balanced representation in federal 
administrations". 
Since September 1995, the Harari regional state has had its own regional 
state constitution that has been enacted and enforced. However, despite the 
fact that the region is designated as a Harari People's region, the Harari 
population is very small in comparison to the rest of the region's residents. 
As a result, two separate chambers of parliament were formed with the 
intention of the people of Harari implementing themselves. Accordingly, 
one of the councils was the sole representative of the Harari ethnic group 
and was empowered to legislate and administer the culture, language, and 
heritage of the nation. The second council, which represents the people of 
the region, has been able to tax, economic police, and govern the region's 
internal administration and executive branch. Accordingly, the Harari 
Nationalities Council has a total of 36 members in the 14‒member Jegol 
Special, 4 members of the Jogol regular constituency and 18 members of the 
constituency outside of Jogol. This was done in the belief that it would 
provide an affirmative measure for the Harari people and provide a lasting 
solution. 
Article 49 (3) and 50 (2) of the 2004 revised Harari regional state 
constitution vividly stipulates that "the Harari National Assembly is elected 
by the Harari ethnic group members found within the region and outside 
the region in different Ethiopian cities and regions". This regional state 
constitutional provision has been supported by the decision of the house of 
people’s representatives. For example, the Ethiopian transitional 
government House of Peoples Representatives conducted the 102th 
ordinary meeting dated 24 Mar 2003 during which it approved such articles 
as part of the Harari regional state constitution. Members of Harari ethnic 
groups from outside the Harari region were elected to the HNA in all five 
national elections. Members of the Harari ethnic group living in Addis 
Abeba, Dire Dawa, Chiro, Deder, Fedise, Haromaya, Kombolcha, Guresem, 
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and Gigiga cities were elected to the HNA for five consecutive national 
elections, according to tangible evidence.  
 
8. Dispute between National Electoral Board and 
Harari Region: Its contents and outcomes 
The prevailing empirical evidence shows that Harari people from 
outside Harari Regional State voted for the HNA in five consecutive 
Ethiopian elections. However, the NEBE has rejected that members of the 
Harari ethnic group living outside of Harari regional state are not eligible 
to vote for the Harari National Assembly members in Ethiopia's sixth 
election (Letter from the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia to the Harari 
Regional State Council (09 Apr 2021). In response, the Harari People's 
Regional State Council, the Harari National Assembly, the Harari People's 
Regional State Secretariat, the Office of the President of the Harari People's 
Regional State, and the Harari Regional State Prosperity Office wrote a 
formal letter to the NEBE to correct the decision issued by the NEBE. 
However, the NEBE replied by arguing that the official letter written by the 
above–mentioned bodies was not acceptable and had no constitutional and 
legal basis. Consequently, the NEBE has attempted to respond in detail, by 
outlining the reasons why Harari people living outside of the region are not 
eligible to vote for HNA members. 
At this point, the NEBE stated that it had investigated the case and the 
presented documents along with the previous elections with respect to the 
constitution and had issued a decision on April 9/2021. The main reasons 
for the request's rejection, according to the NEBE, were as follows. First, 
according to the FDRE constitution, the council members under the 
government structure of a region should be elected by the votes of 
residents within the region. There is no constitutional provision that 
indicates that members of a nationality found outside a region can elect the 
members of a regional council for a nationality with a small number of 
members. And there is no special procedure that should be implemented 
for members of this nationality. 
Second, the Ethiopian transitional government’s house of peoples’ 
representatives convened their 102th regular assembly on 24 Mar 2003 and 
issued a decision stating that members of the nationality found outside the 
region could elect members of the national assembly of Harari by 
referencing an article of the constitution supporting the decision. The board 
has acknowledged that this action should not be taken into consideration in 
the decision. Additionally, one of the conditions indicating that the 
decision that was said to have been rendered by the 102th regular assembly 
of the house of peoples’ representatives on 24 Mar 2003 is that the council’s 
seal is not affixed to the decision. On the other hand, following the 24 Mar 
2003 decision of the house of peoples’ representatives, the board was said 
to have issued a detailed directive that was implemented in the past five 
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elections according to the decision. This directive was not found within the 
board’s office. 
Third, although the national election board may have been letting 
members of the Harari ethnic group found outside the region elect 
members of the national assembly of Harari for the previous five elections, 
according to the election reform being conducted by the board, such 
traditions and procedures which fail to have a constitutional and election 
law basis should be abolished to fulfill its objective. If the board decides 
that the practice of having members of the nationality outside the region 
elect members of the HNA as in the past five elections should continue, and 
if other nationalities with small population numbers request the 
participation of their members found outside the region, and if the board is 
willing to comply, the issue could make the neutral and fair election 
administration of the board questionable. The board is obligated to adopt 
previous practices that are supported by the constitution. Thus, with 
respect to the constitution and the implemented election laws and 
directives, a decision has been issued by rejecting the petition. 
The HNA has petitioned the Ethiopian Federal High Court to reverse 
the decision of the NEBE regarding the voting rights of Harari ethnic group 
members living outside the Harari regional state for the HNA. 
Accordingly, in this paper we will attempt to explain the main points of the 
HNA’s appeals to the Federal High Court. The main point posed by the 
HNA was that a decision was made at the 102th regular assembly 
convened by the House of People's Representatives of the transitional 
government regarding the voting rights of Harari ethnic group members 
living outside the Harari regional state for the HNA, which is a member of 
the Region's Council. As a result, the members of Harari ethnic groups 
outside the Harari region have taken part in all five national elections. 
Consequently, the HNA has presented its request by stating that the NEBE 
should conduct the sixth national election in a similar manner to the 
previous elections.  
The additional critical concern appealed by the HNA to the Federal 
High Court was that the regional constitution’s article 50 (2) stipulates that 
"the HNA is elected by the Harari ethnic group members found within the 
region and outside the region in different Ethiopian cities and 
regions". Furthermore, in support of the above mentioned claim by the 
HNA, the House of Peoples Representatives has also written an official 
letter to the NEBE to correct its decision on the case. In its official letter, the 
House of Peoples Representatives attempts to point out the Ethiopian 
transitional government's House of People’s Representatives decision 
rendered at the 102th ordinary meeting held on 24 Mar 2003. The gist of the 
official letter was that the members of the Harari ethnic group living 
outside of Harari regional state could have the right to vote for the Harari 
National Assembly members in Ethiopia's sixth election. Thus, the HNA 
tried to incorporate and show in its appeal to the Federal High Court, the 
official letter written by the House of People’s Representatives regarding 
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the issue (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 
May 2021). Thus, based on this appeal, the Federal High Court decided in 
favor of the HNA. 
The essence of the decision of the Federal High Court demonstrated that 
the practice of which members of the Harari people residing outside of the 
region, including in different regions and city administrations, are allowed 
to elect members of the two councils named in electing the HNA should be 
reserved since such rights have been protected by legal frameworks, 
including the demand of regional governments (NEBE, HNA No. 
207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 May 2021). In this context, the 
Federal High Court issued the decision by indicating that the sixth national 
electoral process shall be conducted by the NEBE pursuant to the regional 
constitution as well as the decision of the Ethiopian Transitional 
Government House of People’s Representatives at its 102th ordinary 
meeting dated 24 Mar 2003 (HNA, NEBE No. 207036. High Ct. of Ethiopia, 
27 May 2021 6/8 2021). Therefore, the NEBE should execute its mandate 
accordingly (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 
May 2021). 
However, the NEBE appealed its complaint to the federal cassation court 
by stating that the decision issued by the Federal Supreme Court Session 
Bench with File No. 205809 on the date of 27/4/2021 was claimed to have a 
fundamental legal flaw (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of 
Ethiopia, 27 May 2021). Accordingly, the NEBE presented its complaint by 
stating that the Federal High Court lacks the relevant jurisdiction to preside 
over the case and by requesting the decision issued on the core issue to be 
reinforced (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 
May 2021). The appellate bench inspected the arguments of the parties and: 
first, since the provisions of the Harari region’s constitution article 550 (2) 
contradict the FDRE constitution’s article 50 (3), and since the case brings 
about constitutional enquiries, the respondent (the current petitioner) has 
presented a statement by indicating that the court doesn’t have jurisdiction 
to preside over the case (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of 
Ethiopia, 27 May 2021). In this regard, the NEBE has raised the issue by 
stating that the regional constitution’s article 50 (2) provisions contradict 
the provisions of the FDRE constitution’s article 50 (3) and that the issue 
raises a constitutional concern. Thus, the NEBE claimed that the case 
should be resolved by the House of Federation instead of the court (NEBE, 
HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 May 2021). 
The decision of the Federal Caseation Court on the NEBE complaint was 
based on legal frameworks (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. 
of Ethiopia, 27 May 2021). The federal high court proclamation No. 25/1995 
stipulates provisions shall be replaced by the federal high court 
proclamation No. 1234/2013, which shall be enforced beginning on January 
20/2021 (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 May 
2021). As stated under both proclamations, the Federal High Court has the 
jurisdiction to render decisions with regard to disputes and such decisions 
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shall be based on the constitution. Article 3 (1) and Article 3 (3‒A) deal with 
the above issues respectively (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation 
Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 May 2021). In particular, the newly enacted Federal High 
Court proclamation No. 1234/2020 Article 3 (2) deals with the legal 
decisions of the federal high court and it is based on Article 9 (2) of the 
constitution which deals with enforcing constitutional provisions (NEBE, 
HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 May 2021). 
Therefore, the Federal Caseation Court decided on the case that the issue 
appealed by the NEBE does not require interpretation of the constitution 
having constitutional basis to be handled by the regular courts and, 
therefore, the argument stated that the court has no jurisdiction has no legal 
support in this regard (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of 
Ethiopia, 27 May 2021).  
The federal caseation court also conveyed the decision of the transitional 
government during its 102th ordinary meeting, which stated that following 
the implementation of the constitution, the decision shall continue to be 
implemented and shall be consistent with the principles of the constitution 
as understood from the council's minutes (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal 
Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 May 2021). This is why the federal 
constitution, which has been supplemented by the regional constitution, 
was created (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 
May 2021). The FDRE constitutional council held an ordinary meeting on 
24 Mar 2003, during which it endorsed and approved the regional council's 
decision, and, as a result, the articles and principles of the regional 
constitution and the house of people representatives have been consistent 
with the articles and principles of the federal constitution (NEBE, HNA No. 
207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 May 2021). The Federal 
Caseation Court strengthens its decision on the case by citing the federal 
constitution, for example, Article 5 (1) 3, 39 (2), 91 (1) and 2, which deals 
with the protection of the rights and identities of Ethiopian nations, 
nationalities, and peoples, including protection of language, culture, 
heritage, and identity, for which the government provides protection and 
guarantee (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 
May 2021). 
Furthermore, the Federal Caseation Court stated that the country has 
accepted international conventions such as civil and political rights of 
groups or individuals, conventions and declarations on social, cultural, and 
economic rights, and conventions and declarations on minority rights and 
interests. Articles 1 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, as well as the UN General Assembly decision on December 
28, 1999, under Decision No. 47/137, have been addressed in relation to the 
rights and interests of nations, nationalities, religions, or minority groups, 
as well as protection of their identity (NEBE, HNA No. 207036, Federal 
Cassation Ct. of Ethiopia, 27 May 2021). In addition, we can learn from the 
experience of developed nations and democratic societies that such rights 
must be protected and guaranteed. The Harari people have benefited from 
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such rights and benefits, and the language, culture, identity, and heritage of 
minority groups will be protected, as stated in the constitution. The 
purpose of establishing the HNA under a different legal framework is to 
realize and attend to the constitutional rights of the Harari people, as well 
as to make it easier for Harari people members to participate in the 
electoral process. 
In general, when we look at the decisions of the Federal High Court and 
the Federal Cassation Court, we can see that the decisions are legal and 
appropriate. This is due to the fact that Article 50 (2) of the Harari regional 
state constitution clearly states that members of the Harari ethnic group 
living outside of Harari regional state are eligible to vote for the HNA. 
Furthermore, after deliberating on the matter, a committee appointed by 
the House of Peoples' Representatives in 24 Mar 2003 to investigate the 
matter decided to keep the Harari people outside the Harari regional state 
for the HNA. This decision conveyed by the Federal High Court and the 
Federal Cassation Court has the potential to have a significant positive 
impact on the rights of Ethiopian minority groups. It truly breaks new 
ground for the millions of minority communities whose voting rights are 
still being denied by Ethiopia's National Electoral Board. 
 
9. Conclusion and recommendation   
Ethiopia's national minority protection situation has significantly 
improved since the adoption of a federal state structure, as various laws 
allowing national minorities to have more rights, such as establishing 
National Councils or using their mother tongues in the process of 
education or elsewhere, have been implemented. In addition to equal 
protection, the FDRE Constitution has protected collective rights for 
minorities, rights that are aimed at assisting minority groups in keeping 
and maintaining their identity, language, religion, and culture. The Harari 
regional state constitution and the FDRE constitution have acknowledged 
the need for the protection of collective rights of minority ethnic groups. 
However, it has become clear that additional measures may be required to 
better protect indigenous minorities' rights from discrimination, promote 
their identity, and assist them in preserving their culture and traditions. As 
previously stated, this is due to the fact that the attempt by the NEBE to 
refuse voting rights to members of the Harari ethnic group living outside of 
the Harari regional state for HNA members in Ethiopia's sixth election is a 
deliberate act aimed at violating indigenous minorities' rights. Thus, 
affirmative action measures for members of minority groups are 
often required to close the gap that discriminatory policies, where they 
were used in the past, created between the majority and those belonging to 
minorities. As a result, strong and institutionalized affirmative action is 
often required not only against acts of the state, but also against 
discriminatory acts of other parties within the state. These measures may 
also be required to ensure the survival and continued development of the 
minority's cultural, religious, and social identities. 
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In a nutshell, elections are the mechanisms through which citizen 
preferences are translated into political leadership in a democracy. To 
understand how democracy works in an ethnically divided society, it is 
necessary to understand how voters behave during elections in a variety of 
settings. In this regard, it is undeniable that the NEBE has inadvertently 
attempted to resist the rights of indigenous minority Hararis (who live in 
other parts of the country) to vote for HNA candidates. The basic reasons 
for the NEBE to do so have no legal justification and are challenged by the 
federal and regional constitutions, particularly by Harari regional state 
constitutional provisions explicitly addressing minorities and Hararis 
residing outside the Harari region to vote.  
The federal cassation court's final decisions were found to be correct, 
fair, and acceptable, as well as in accordance with the federal and regional 
constitutions. The federal and regional constitutions of the country played 
a prominent role in protecting the rights of minorities to vote. In relation to 
the decisions of the federal Supreme Court and the cassation court, both the 
Harari regional state constitution and the federal constitution played a 
significant role. In general, indigenous national minorities can easily 
participate or exercise their right to vote as long as the democratic rights of 
minorities to vote are adequately addressed in constitutions and the 
judiciary system functions freely and fairly.  
Overall, the incident initiated by the NEBE could have led to 
unnecessary mass mobilizations, demonstrations, conflict, and bloodshed. 
However, the Harari regional government, the leaders, HNA, and the 
public managed the situation by taking the case to the courts to obtain 
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